A primal-dual algorithm for computing Fisher equilibrium in the absence of gross substitutability property  by Garg, Dinesh et al.
Theoretical Computer Science 378 (2007) 143–152
www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
A primal-dual algorithm for computing Fisher equilibrium in the
absence of gross substitutability propertyI
Dinesh Garga,1, Kamal Jainb,∗, Kunal Talwarb, Vijay V. Vaziranic
aDepartment of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore - 560 012, India
bOne Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA 98052, United States
cCollege of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332-0280, United States
Abstract
We provide the first strongly polynomial time exact combinatorial algorithm to compute Fisher equilibrium for the case when
utility functions do not satisfy the Gross substitutability property. The motivation for this comes from the work of Kelly, Maulloo,
and Tan [F.P. Kelly, A.K. Maulloo, D.K.H. Tan, Rate control for communication networks: Shadow prices, proportional fairness
and stability, Journal of Operational Research (1998)] and Kelly and Vazirani [F.P. Kelly, Vijay V. Vazirani, Rate control as a
market equilibrium (2003) (in preparation)] on rate control in communication networks. We consider a tree like network in which
root is the source and all the leaf nodes are the sinks. Each sink has got a fixed amount of money which it can use to buy the
capacities of the edges in the network. The edges of the network sell their capacities at certain prices. The objective of each edge
is to fix a price that can fetch the maximum money for it, and the objective of each sink is to buy capacities on edges in such a
way that it can facilitate the sink to pull maximum flow from the source. In this problem, the edges and the sinks play precisely
the role of sellers and buyers, respectively, in Fisher’s market model. The utility of a buyer (or sink) takes the form of a Leontief
function which is known for not satisfying Gross substitutability property. We develop an O(m3) exact combinatorial algorithm for
computing equilibrium prices of the edges. The time taken by our algorithm is independent of the values of sink money and edge
capacities. A corollary of our algorithm is that equilibrium prices and flows are rational numbers. Although there are algorithms to
solve this problem they are all based on convex programming techniques. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first strongly
polynomial time exact combinatorial algorithm for computing equilibrium prices of Fisher’s model under the case when buyers’
utility functions do not satisfy gross substitutability property.
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1. Motivation
The primary motivation for our work comes from the work of Kelly [19], Kelly, Maulloo, and Tan [17], and Kelly
and Vazirani [18] on rate control in communication networks. The key issue addressed in these papers is how the
available bandwidth within the network should be shared among the competing streams of the traffic during the period
of congestion. By and large, these papers address the variants of the following problem. Consider a communication
network having finite number of users and each user needs to send the data from a source to a sink along a specific
path. Each user has a well defined utility function that defines the utility derived by the user if he is able to send
the data through the network at a particular rate. Given the facts that communication links of the network have finite
capacities and the data traversal paths of the users have links in common, the users cannot be allowed to send the data at
arbitrarily high rate because it will cause congestion in the network. Therefore, the issue is to calculate an optimal data
transfer rate for each user so that the network can operate without resulting in congestion and at the same, individual
users are kept happy in the sense that their utilities get maximized at this optimal rate. Typically, the network does
not know the utility functions of the users and, therefore, faces the difficulty in computing these optimal rates. The
solution proposed by Kelly et al. [17] suggests to charge the toll from the users for using the links of the networks. That
is, assign the prices to the links in such a way that the users find it in their best interest to send the data at optimal rate.
In order to realize such a scheme in practice, Kelly et al. [17] proposed two algorithms — primal and dual. In primal
scheme, each user incrementally adapts its rate and each link decides its price as a function of total flow it sees. In
dual scheme, each link incrementally adapts its price and each user decides its rate by a function of total price he sees.
The above problem can be mapped to the setting of an economic market, where each link can be viewed as a
unique good that is put for the sale in the market; the capacity of the link can be viewed as quantity of the good, and
the users of the network can be viewed as buyers who are interested in buying different combinations of the goods
in different quantities depending on locations of their respective source and sink. Now, computing the prices of the
links is equivalent to computing the market equilibrium prices for these goods. This is the major theme behind the
investigations made in this paper. In this paper, we address the problem of computing the prices of network resource
for congestion avoidance, but from the perspective of market equilibrium. We consider a very special tree link network
in which root is the source and all the leaf nodes are the sinks. Each sink has got a fixed amount of money which it
can use to buy the capacities of the edges in the network. The edges of the network sell their capacities at certain
prices. The objective of each edge is to fix a price that can fetch the maximum money for it, and the objective of each
sink is to buy capacities on edges in such a way that it can facilitate the sink to pull maximum flow from the source.
In this problem, the edges and the sinks play precisely the role of sellers and buyers, respectively, in Fisher’s market
model. The utility of a buyer (or sink) takes the form of Leontief function which is known for not satisfying the gross
substitutability property. We develop an O(m3) exact combinatorial algorithm for computing equilibrium prices of the
edges. The time taken by our algorithm is independent of the values of sink money and edge capacities. A corollary of
our algorithm is that equilibrium prices and flows are rational numbers. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first
strongly polynomial time exact combinatorial algorithm for computing equilibrium prices of Fisher’s model under the
case when buyers’ utility functions do not satisfy the gross substitutability property. However, our algorithm is very
much tuned for the special structure of the problem.
2. Outline
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 3, we first explain the concept of market equilibrium and
then formally define the Fisher equilibrium. Section 4 provides a survey of the literature related to market equilibria
computation. In Section 5, we define the problem in a more formal way. In Section 6, we develop an Eisenberg–Gale
type convex program and show that the solution of this program constitutes the equilibrium prices of the original
problem. Section 7 describes our algorithm and Section 8 presents the analysis of the algorithm. Section 9 constitutes
the conclusions and future directions.
3. Market equilibrium
The study of market equilibrium has occupied the central stage within both positive (or descriptive) and normative
(or prescriptive) economics. The notion of market equilibrium was first proposed by Walras [24] in his pioneering
work on the theory of social wealth. This equilibrium is popularly known as competitive or Walrasian equilibrium.
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Walras formulated the state of the economic system at any point of time as the solution of a system of simultaneous
equations representing the demand for goods by consumers, the supply of goods by producers, and the equilibrium
condition that supply equals demand on every market. It was assumed that each consumer acts so as to maximize his
utility, each producer acts so as to maximize his profit, and perfect competition prevails in the sense that each consumer
and producer regards the prices paid and received as independent of his own choices. Walras did not, however, give
any conclusive argument to show that the equations, as given, have a solution and thus left behind an open problem of
investigating the existence of market equilibrium [1].
3.1. Existence of market equilibrium
The existence of market equilibrium is a deeply investigated problem. In the literature [23,1], this problem has
been approached by placing different assumptions on the endowment and utility functions of the agents. An answer to
this problem was given in the seminal work of two Nobel Laureates Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu in 1954 [1].
They proved the existence of competitive market equilibria under quite general setting of concave utility functions
by applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. The assumptions made by Arrow–Debreu are much weaker and closer
to economic reality than the assumptions made by Wald [23]. The proof outlined by Arrow–Debreu is highly non-
constructive in nature and, therefore, the natural question down the line is the existence of an efficient computation
process which establishes the equilibrium.
3.2. Fisher equilibrium
Contemporary to Walras, Irving Fisher [22] also independently modelled the market equilibrium in 1891. However,
Fisher’s model turns out to be the special case of Walras’ model. Fisher’s market model assumes that there are two
kinds of traders in the market: buyers and sellers who trade over a finite set of commodities. Buyers have money and
utility functions for goods. Sellers have initial endowment of goods and want to earn money. The equilibrium prices
are defined as assignment of prices to goods, so that when every consumer buys an optimal bundle then market clears
i.e. all the money is spent and all the goods are sold. If money is also considered as a commodity then it is easy to see
that the Fisher model is a special case of the Walras model. For the purpose of defining the Fisher equilibrium in a
formal manner, let us consider a market consisting of n buyers and m divisible goods. Buyer i has, initially, a positive
amount of money mi . The amount of good j available in the market is c j . Let for buyer i , X i ⊂ <m+ represents the
consumption set, i.e., the set of bundles of m goods which buyer i can consume. Let ui : X i 7→ < be the utility
function for buyer i . Given the prices p1, . . . , pm , it is easy to compute the bundle xi ∈ X i which will maximize
buyer i’s utility subject to his budget constraint. The prices p∗1, . . . , p∗m are said to be Fisher equilibrium prices if
after each buyer is assigned such an optimal bundle, there is no surplus or deficiency of any goods. If x∗i j denotes the
amount of good j bought by buyer i in his optimal bundle x∗i at prices p∗1, . . . , p∗m , then it can be verified [1] that this
price vector p∗1, . . . , p∗m is Fisher equilibrium iff it satisfies the following conditions:
•
(∑n
i=1 x∗i j − c j
)
≤ 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . ,m;
• p∗j
(∑n
i=1 x∗i j − c j
)
= 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . ,m
• x∗i maximizes ui (xi ) over the set
{
xi ∈ X i |∑mj=1 xi j p∗j ≤ mi} for every i = 1, . . . , n
• p∗j ≥ 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . ,m.
The Arrow–Debreu theorem [1] says that if the utility functions ui (.) are concave then such an equilibrium price
vector always exists. It is easy to see that in equilibrium, each buyer must spend his full budget.
3.3. Gross substitutability
Gross substitutability is a well-studied property that has useful economic interpretation [11]. Goods are said to
be Gross substitutes for a buyer iff increasing the price of a good does not decrease the buyer’s demand for other
goods. The demand of a buyer is basically the vector of quantity of each good that the buyer would like to buy in
order to maximize his/her utility with respect to the given prices and the budget constraint. Similarly, goods in an
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economy are said to be Gross substitutes iff increasing the price of a good does not decrease the total demand of
other goods. Clearly, if the goods are Gross substitutes for every buyer, they are Gross substitutes in the economy.
Note that, whether goods are Gross substitutes or not for a given buyer i depends solely on his own utility function
ui (xi ). It can be shown that not all concave utility functions satisfy this property. Computing Fisher equilibrium when
the buyers utility functions do not satisfy Gross substitutability property is a far more difficult problem than the case
when they satisfy this property. A frequently arising utility function that does not satisfy this property is a Leontief
utility function. A Leontief utility function for buyer i in Fisher’s model looks like this: ui (xi ) = min j (xi j ). We will
be using this utility function in our problem.
4. Literature related to computation of market equilibria
The recent papers by Papadimitriou [21] and Deng et al. [5,4] have raised and partly answered the question of
efficient computability of Walrasian equilibrium. These papers have sparked the avalanche of research in this area
and have initiated altogether a new frontier on algorithmic theory for market equilibria. Much of the literature in
this direction is aimed at developing a polynomial time algorithm for computing the Walrasian equilibrium either
accurately or approximately under different simplifying assumptions. We prefer to classify the existing literature into
three categories.
The first category includes the literature which address the problem of developing efficient algorithm for computing
the Fisher equilibrium under the linear utility case. Way back in 1960s, Eisenberg and Gale [8,9] first formulated the
problem of Fisher equilibrium with linear utilities as a convex optimization problem. They constructed an aggregated
concave objective function that is maximized at the equilibrium. Thus, finding an equilibrium in this setting becomes
solving a convex optimization problem. This implicitly implies a polynomial time (approximation) algorithm, in
the sense of numerical computing, i.e., polynomial time in input size and log(1/), where  is the precision in
computation. The first exact polynomial-time algorithm for this setting was proposed by Devanur et al. [6] which
uses primal-dual type approach.
The second category includes the literature that address the problem of developing efficient algorithm for
computing Walrasian equilibrium when the production firms are absent and the utilities are linear. The first algorithm
for this setting was proposed by Deng et al. [5] where they developed a polynomial-time algorithm for this setting with
an additional assumption that the number of goods or agents is bounded. In the recent past, a number of approximation
algorithms have emerged for this setting. Newman and Primak [20] developed an approximate algorithm which runs
the ellipsoid algorithm on an infinite linear program. Recently an FPTAS was proposed for the same setting by Jain,
Mahdian, and Saberi [13]. In this FPTAS, the running time depends on the size of the numbers representing the
utilities and endowments of the traders. Recently, Devanur and Vazirani [7] developed a strongly polynomial time
approximation scheme for the same problem and their algorithm builds upon the main ideas behind the algorithm in
[6]. Garg and Kapoor [10] have also proposed a fully polynomial time approximation algorithm for the same problem
but they use an auction based approach. Jain [14] have shown that computing the Walrasian equilibrium for this
setting is indeed equivalent to solving a convex optimization problem. Jain has used this convex program to develop
the first polynomial time exact algorithm for computing the Walrasian equilibrium for this setting. This algorithm uses
ellipsoid algorithm and simultaneous diophantine approximation. Thus, the algorithm proposed by Jain [14] settles the
open problem of computing the market equilibria efficiently under the scenario when utilities are linear and production
firms are absent. However, designing efficient market equilibrium algorithms for general concave utility functions is
still an open problem. Using the convex program proposed by Jain [14], Ye [25] developed a practical interior point
algorithm to find the Walrasian equilibrium under the same setting.
The third category includes the literature that address the problem of developing efficient algorithm for computing
Walrasian equilibrium when the production firms are absent and the utility functions do not satisfy the Gross
substitutability (the linear utility functions satisfy the Gross substitutability property). The problem of computing
the market equilibrium with linear utilities is comparatively simpler because they satisfy the Gross substitutability,
i.e., increasing the price of one good cannot decrease the demand for another. Hence for such utility functions,
monotonically raising prices suffices. In contract, concave and even piecewise-linear and concave, utility functions do
not satisfy Gross substitutability, hence requiring the more involved process of increasing and decreasing prices.
Therefore, designing market equilibrium algorithms for them remains an outstanding open problem. In a recent
paper, Ye [26] addresses the problem of computing Fisher equilibrium with piecewise linear utility functions, which
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include Leontief’s utility functions. In this paper, the author shows that the Fisher model again reduces to the
general analytic center model discussed in [25], and the same linear programming complexity bound applies to
approximating its equilibrium. Another article in the similar spirit is due to Codenotti and Vardarajan [3] where
the authors propose a polynomial time approximate algorithm for computation of market equilibrium for the Fisher
model where the traders have Leontief utility functions. Their result builds upon the construction of a constrained
nonlinear maximization problem. In another related paper, Codenotti, Pemmaraju, and Varadarajan [2] propose the
first polynomial-time algorithms for the same setting but with the assumption that traders utility functions satisfy the
weak Gross substitutability property.
5. Problem statement
The precise problem we solve is the following: Let T = (V, E) be a tree with integer capacities on edges. Let root
of the tree be a source node and T = {t1, . . . , tk} be the sink nodes. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
each sink ti is the leaf node and conversely each leaf node is a sink.2 The sinks have budgets m1, . . . ,mk , respectively.
Each sink can use its budget to buy the capacities of the edges in the network. The edges of the network sell their
capacities at certain prices. The objective of each edge is to fix a price which can fetch maximum money for it and,
at the same time, the objective of each sink is to buy capacities on edges in such a way that it can facilitate the sink
to pull maximum flow from the source. In order to map this problem to Fisher’s market model, we view edges as the
sellers who are trying to sell their capacities and sinks as buyers who are trying to buy the capacities on the edges
and whose Leontief utilities are given by ui (xi ) = min j | j∈Pi (xi j ), where xi j is amount of the capacity bought by
sink ti on edge j and Pi is the collection of edges that forms a unique path from source to sink ti . The problem is to
determine Fisher equilibrium prices for all the edges, and flows from the source to the sinks. It is easy to verify from
the definition of Fisher equilibrium given in Section 3.2 that edge prices pe∀e ∈ E and flows fi from source to each
sink ti , form Fisher equilibrium iff they satisfy the following conditions:
1. fe ≤ ce ∀e ∈ E .
2. For any edge e ∈ E , if pe > 0, then fe = ce.
3. For any edge e ∈ E , if fe < ce, then pe = 0
4. fi = mi(∑
e|e∈Pi pe
)
5. pe ≥ 0∀e ∈ E , fi ≥ 0∀ti ∈ T
where ce and fe are the capacity and total flow, respectively for the edge e ∈ E . The Pi is the set of edges which forms
a unique path in the tree T from the source to the sink ti . For each edge e ∈ E , the total flow fe is given by flow con-
servation equation fe =∑ti |e∈Pi fi . Note that the first condition corresponds to capacity constraint, the second, third,
and fourth conditions correspond to three equilibrium conditions, and the fifth condition is obviously a nonnegativity
constraint. Also note that in view of the first condition, the second condition can be relaxed slightly and fe = ce can be
replaced by fe ≥ ce. Thus, we can say that our problem is to design an algorithm which will take a tree T = (V, E),
the capacities c1, . . . , cm of all the edges, and the budgets m1, . . . ,mk of all the sink nodes as the input and will return
the numbers pe ∀e ∈ E, fe ∀e ∈ E, fi ∀ti ∈ T such that these numbers satisfy the above five conditions.
6. Convex program and equilibrium
It is interesting to see that the problem of computing market equilibrium that we sketched in the previous section
is captured by the following Eisenberg–Gale type convex program which maximizes the sum of logarithms of flows,








fi ≤ ce ∀e ∈ E
fi ≥ 0 ∀ti ∈ T .
2 If a sink ti is an internal node then we can always add an additional leaf edge of infinity capacity at that particular internal node and push the
sink ti to this newly generated leaf node. Similarly, if a leaf node is not a sink then we can just remove the corresponding leaf edge from the tree.
148 D. Garg et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 378 (2007) 143–152
Let pe’s be the dual variables (also called Lagrange multipliers) corresponding to the first set of constraints; we will
interpret these as prices of the edges. Using KKT conditions, one can show that fi ’s and pe’s form an optimal solution
to the primal problem (1) and its corresponding dual problem, respectively, iff they satisfy the following four condi-
tions.
1. Primal Feasibility∑
ti |e∈Pi fi ≤ ce ∀e ∈ E
fi ≥ 0 ∀ti ∈ T
2. Dual Feasibility
pe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E
3. Complementary Slackness




) ∀ti ∈ T .
It is easy to verify that the above conditions are precisely the same as the six conditions mentioned in the previ-
ous section which must be satisfied by the output of our algorithm. Thus, we basically develop a primal dual type
algorithm to solve the above optimization problem where the primal variables are flows and the dual variables are
edge prices. Almost all the known primal-dual type algorithms for solving such programs operate by raising dual
variables greedily. An important exception is Edmonds’ general weighted graph matching algorithm which uses a
sophisticated increase–decrease process to find an optimal dual. A possible exception could be [15] where the new
auxiliary variables only increase but the original dual variables may increase–decrease. In fact in our algorithm too
there are auxiliary variables which only increase. In this respect, our algorithm resembles Edmonds’ algorithm, with
edge prices increasing and decreasing in order to find equilibrium prices for the edges. In our algorithm, the equilib-
rium prices are essentially unique in the following sense: for each sink ti , the cost of the path from the source to the
sink is the same in all the equilibria. We denote the cost of the path from the source to the sink ti as price(ti ) and it is
given by
∑
e|e∈Pi pe. A corollary of our algorithm is that equilibrium prices and flows are rational numbers. We show
that this does not hold even if there are just two sources in the tree.
7. The algorithm
Here is a high level description of our algorithm: We start with zero prices of the edges and iteratively change
prices. Since prices are zero initially, all the sinks draw infinity flows and hence all the edges are over-saturated; we
iteratively decrease the number of such edges. We maintain the following invariants throughout our algorithm
I1. For any edge e ∈ E , if pe > 0, then fe ≥ ce.
I2. For any edge e ∈ E , if fe < ce, then pe = 0
I3. fi = mi(∑
e|e∈Pi pe
) ∀ti ∈ T
I4. pe ≥ 0∀e ∈ E , fi ≥ 0∀ti ∈ T
I5. fe =∑ti |e∈Pi fi ∀e ∈ E .
Thus, we maintain dual feasibility, complementary slackness, and Lagrange optimality conditions throughout the
algorithm. The only condition that is not maintained is primal feasibility. Thus, our algorithm would terminate at the
point where primal feasibility is attained. At such point, all KKT conditions would have been met and the current
values of fi and pe would be the desired solution. At any instant during the course of the algorithm, each edge would
be marked either red or green. If an edge e is marked as green then it means that primal feasibility condition fe ≤ ce
is being satisfied at that edge. Initially, all the edges are red and the subroutine make-green converts at least one red
edge into green. The Algorithm 1 below gives the high level pseudo code for the algorithm. Later we will show that
this algorithm also maintains the following invariants.
I6. The parameter price(ti ) is non-decreasing throughout the algorithm for each sink ti , and flows fi are non-increasing.
I7. At any instant, the price of a red edge is zero and the set of red edges forms a subtree containing the root of the
original tree.
In what follows we describe the subroutinemake-green which is the crux of the algorithm.
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Algorithm 1Market Equilibrium
Procedure Market Equilibrium(V, E, c1, . . . , cm,m1, . . . ,mk):
1: pe ← 0 ∀e ∈ E
2: fi ←∞ ∀ti ∈ T
3: mark[e] ← red ∀e ∈ E
4: if (∃e ∈ E such that mark[e] = red) then





Before we can describe this subroutine, we need to define two concepts.
Definition 1 (Lower Vertex). We will say that vertex u is lower than v if vertex u is a descendent of vertex v in the
tree T . Similarly edge (u, v) is lower than (a, b) if vertex u is a descendent of vertex b, vertex v is a children of vertex
u, and vertex b is a children of vertex a.
Definition 2 (Feasible Flow). Consider a partition P of E into red and green edges. Let pe be the current assignment
of prices to the edges. Let this partition-price pair (P, p) satisfies the invariant I7. A flow f is said to be feasible for
this partition-price pair (P, p) if it satisfies the five invariant conditions I1 through I5 mentioned earlier.
In view of the above definitions, we first explain the subroutine make-green at a very high level in terms of its input
parameters and output parameters. Apart from others, the following are the critical input parameters to each call to
the subroutine make-green
1. A partition-price pair (P, p) which satisfies the invariant I7.
2. A feasible flow, f , for this partition-price pair.
The subroutine make-green converts at least one red edge into green and produces the following parameters as the
output
1. A new partition-price pair (P ′, p′).
2. A feasible flow, f ′, for the new partition-price pair (P ′, p′).
The partition-price pair (P ′, p′) returned by make-green respects the invariant I7. Later we will show in Lemma 4
that each call to the subroutinemake-green requires O(m2) computations, wherem is the number of edges in the tree.
The subroutine make-green accomplishes this via an involved process that increases and decreases prices on edges.
By looking at Algorithm 1, one can easily verify that a total of O(m) calls ofmake-green suffice and this leads to the
following results.
Theorem 1. O(m3) computations suffice to find an optimal solution to convex program (1) and the corresponding
equilibrium prices and flows for trees. Furthermore, such trees always admit a rational solution.
Theorem 2. The time taken by the Algorithm 1 does not depend on actual values of sink money and edge capacities
and therefore the Algorithm 1 is strongly polynomial.
Now, we give a detailed explanation of how the subroutine make-green works. The subroutine make-green works
iteratively. Every time the subroutinemake-green is called, it starts by picking a topologically lowest red edge (u, v),
i.e., all edges lower than (u, v) are green. If in the given feasible flow f , the edge (u, v) carries a flow less than or
equal to its capacity then turn this edge into green and return. This will give a new partition with an extra green edge,
the new prices for edges, and a feasible flow for the new partition-price pair.
Otherwise, let Z be the set of vertices reachable from v by the following green zero price edges. Z is called a zero
component of the edge (u, v). Let A be the set of edges both whose end points are in Z . Let B be the set of edges
incident on Z , excluding the edge (u, v). Clearly, all edges in A must be green and must have zero prices and all
edges in B must be green and must have positive prices. Let T1 ⊂ T be the set of sinks that are sitting inside the zero
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component Z , T2 ⊂ T be the set of sinks that are sitting outside the zero component Z but are lower than vertex v,
and T3 ⊂ T be the set of remaining sinks. Note that it is quite possible that T1 is an empty set.
Now the idea is following. Increase the price of the red edge (u, v) and decrease the price of each edge in the set B
by the same amount. This will result in price(ti ) to be undisturbed for all the sinks in the set T2 as well as in the set T3.
However, this would increase the price(ti ) for all the sinks in the set T1. After changing these prices, we recompute
the flows fi for each sink by using the formula given by invariant I3. Note that fi would remain unchanged for all the
sinks in the set T2 as well as in the set T3. However, fi would decrease for all the sinks in the set T1. Thus, the flow
on edge (u, v) may decrease.
The obvious question now is how much to increase the price of red edge (u, v). Note that during this process of
increasing the price of edge (u, v), any one of the following two events may occur.
E1: The flow on edge (u, v) hits its capacity.
E2: The price of some edge in the set B goes to zero.
If the event E1 occurs then turn the red edge (u, v) into green and this will give a new partition with an extra green
edge, the new prices for edges, and a feasible flow for the new partition-price pair. If the event E2 occurs then we
freeze the price of edge (u, v) and the edges in the set B at their current values. Now we need to reconstruct the zero
component Z and the sets A, B, T1, T2, and T3 because the edge whose price became zero as a consequence of E2
needs to be added to B. We now repeat the process of increasing the price of red edge (u, v) from its current value. In




mi , fgreen =
∑
ti∈T2
fi , pmin = min (pe|e ∈ B).
Now we distinguish between two cases:
• Case 1: ( fgreen > c(u,v))
It is easy to see that if this is the case then the next event would be E2.
• Case 2: ( fgreen ≤ c(u,v))
Under this case, it is easy to verify that if minC(u,v)− fgreen − p(u,v) ≤ pmin then event E1 will occur, otherwise event E2
will occur.
The Algorithm 2 gives the pseudo code for the subroutine make-green .
8. Analysis
In this section, we state key observations and facts pertaining to the algorithm. We have omitted the proofs because
they are quite straightforward and follow directly from the way we have structured the algorithm.
Lemma 1. If an edge e becomes green in an iteration of Algorithm 1 then it will remain green in all the future
iterations of the Algorithm 1.
Lemma 2. The invariant I7 is maintained throughout the Algorithm 1.
Lemma 3. The invariant I6 is maintained throughout the Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3. The prices p and flow f attained by the Algorithm 1 at its termination are equilibrium prices and flow.
Lemma 4. The running time of each call of the subroutine make-green is bounded by O(m2) and also this running
time is independent of actual values of sink money and edge capacities.
8.1. Rational solution
The results in this section highlights the fact that the solution given by our algorithm consists of only rational
numbers.
Theorem 4. As long as all the sinks in the tree draw their flows from single source, the convex program (1) has a
rational solution.
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Algorithm 2 Subroutine make-green
Procedure make− green(V, E,m,mark[.], f, p):
1: find topologically lowest edge e such that mark[e] = red
2: if fe ≤ ce then
3: mark[e] ← green
4: return
5: else
6: construct zero component Z , sets B, T1, and T2 for the edge e
7: min←∑ti∈T1 mi
8: fgreen←∑ti∈T2 fi
9: pmin← min (pe|e ∈ B)
10: if fgreen > ce then
11: pe′ ← pe′ − pmin ∀e′ ∈ B
12: pe ← pe + pmin
13: fti ← mipe ∀ti ∈ T1




Ce− fgreen − pe
)
≤ pmin then
16: pe′ ← pe′ −
(
min
Ce− fgreen − pe
)
∀e′ ∈ B
17: pe ← minCe− fgreen
18: fti ← mipe ∀ti ∈ T1
19: mark[e] ← green
20: return
21: else
22: Go to line number 12
23: end if
24: end if
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3 and Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. Even if there are multiple equilibria for convex program (1), the path price for each sink ti , i.e. price(ti ),
is unique.
Proof. Note that the objective function of the convex program (1) is strictly concave. This implies that this program
must have a unique optimal solution, say f ∗. However, there may be multiple optimal solutions of the corresponding
dual program. Now by virtue of Lagrange Optimality condition for this convex program, we can claim that even if
there are multiple equilibria ( f ∗, p∗) for the convex program (1), the path price for each sink ti , i.e. price(ti ), is
unique.
Lemma 6. The path price for each sink ti , i.e. price(ti ), is a rational number.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3 and Lemma 4.
8.2. Multiple sources and irrational solution
If there are multiple sources present in the tree then it may give rise to irrational equilibrium prices and flows. For
example, consider a tree on three nodes, {a, b, c} and two edges {ab, bc}. Let the capacity of (a, b) be one unit and
the capacity of (b, c) be two units. The source sink pairs together with their budgets are: (a, b, 1), (a, c, 1), (b, c, 1).
Then the equilibrium price for ab is
√





The primal-dual schema has been very successful in obtaining exact and approximation algorithms for solving
linear programs arising from combinatorial optimization problems. Ref. [6] and our paper seem to indicate that it
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is worthwhile applying this schema to solving specific classes of nonlinear programs. There are several interesting
convex programs in the Eisenberg–Gale family itself, see [16] and the references therein. Another family of nonlinear
programs deserving immediate attention is semidefinite programs. Considering the large running time required to
solve such programs, it will be very nice to derive a combinatorial approximation algorithm for MAX CUT for
instance, achieving the same approximation factor as [12].
Extending our algorithm to handling arbitrary directed cyclic graphs is another challenging open problem. Also
interesting will be to obtain approximation algorithms for the cases where the solution is irrational. Another interesting
question is to obtain an auction-based algorithm for tree (or acyclic graphs) along the lines of [10]. Such an algorithm
will be more useful in practice than our current algorithm.
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